



MAQOLAT: Journal of Islamic Studies

Journal website: <https://maqolat.com/>

ISSN : 2985-5829 (Online)

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.58355/maqolat.v4i3.244>

Vol. 4, No. 3 (2026)

pp. 295-307

Research Article

Between Saying and Showing: The Limits of Language and the Problem of Expression in Wittgenstein and Sufi Shathahāt

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Received : May 12, 2026

Revised : June 18, 2026

Accepted : July 24, 2026

Available online : August 28, 2026

How to Cite: Nani Widiawati. (2026). Between Saying and Showing: The Limits of Language and the Problem of Expression in Wittgenstein and Sufi Shathahāt. *MAQOLAT: Journal of Islamic Studies*, 4(3), 295–307. <https://doi.org/10.58355/maqolat.v4i3.244>

Abstract. This paper examines the problem of the limits of language through a comparative analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Sufi tradition of shathahāt (ecstatic utterances). In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein famously distinguishes between what can be said and what can only be shown, thereby establishing a boundary beyond which language fails to express meaning. This study argues that Sufi shathahāt, as found in figures such as Al-Hallaj and Bayazid Bastami, do not simply violate this boundary but instead transform it. Rather than demonstrating the impossibility of expressing the ineffable, shathahāt employ symbolic, paradoxical, and analogical language to articulate meanings that cannot be fully captured by propositional discourse. By bringing these two traditions into dialogue, the paper proposes a rethinking of the “unsayable”: not as that which lies entirely beyond language, but as that which can be expressed without being exhausted. This approach challenges the rigid dichotomy between saying and showing, suggesting instead a spectrum of expression in which language operates at its limits. The study contributes to contemporary discussions in Filsafat Bahasa

and Filsafat Agama by offering a cross-cultural perspective on the relationship between language, meaning, and transcendence.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, Shathiyat, Ineffability, Mystical Language, Religious Language

INTRODUCTION

The problem of the limits of language has occupied a central position in modern Filsafat Bahasa, particularly in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein famously articulates a distinction between what can be meaningfully said and what can only be shown (Wittgenstein, 1922). Propositions, according to his picture theory, are capable of representing states of affairs in the world; however, certain domains—such as ethics, metaphysics, and the mystical—fall beyond the scope of propositional language. These domains are not dismissed as meaningless in a trivial sense, but rather understood as ineffable, that is, incapable of being expressed within the limits of logical language (Hong & Donghui, 2007).

This distinction culminates in Wittgenstein's well-known conclusion that "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent," a statement that has generated extensive debate within philosophy of language and philosophy of religion. The ineffable, in this framework, is not something non-existent, but something that resists articulation in propositional form. As several interpretations suggest, the *Tractatus* does not deny the presence of the mystical; rather, it situates it at the boundary of language, where meaning is no longer said but only shown. Wittgenstein highlights how the mystical aspect lies beyond the reach of propositional language. This limitation of language safeguards ethics and the ineffable—things that reveal themselves precisely when words fail (Ghosh, 2025).

Subsequent scholarship has expanded this discussion by examining how ineffability might still find expression in actual linguistic practices. For instance, later readings of Wittgenstein emphasize that language is embedded in forms of life and rule-governed usage, suggesting that even what is considered ineffable may be indirectly expressed through specific linguistic techniques (Knepper, 2009). This shift opens an important question: if ineffable meanings can be "shown," can they also be expressed in ways that challenge the strict boundary between saying and showing?

Despite the richness of these debates, the discussion has remained largely confined within Western philosophical traditions. Comparative engagement with non-Western traditions—particularly those that have long grappled with the problem of expressing transcendence—remains relatively underdeveloped. This represents a significant gap in contemporary scholarship, especially in light of traditions such as Sufism, where language is deliberately stretched to articulate experiences that exceed ordinary conceptual frameworks.

Within the Sufi tradition, the phenomenon of shathahāt (ecstatic or paradoxical utterances) offers a compelling case for rethinking the limits of language. These utterances, associated with figures such as Al-Hallaj and Bayazid Bastami, often take the form of seemingly contradictory or theologically provocative statements. Rather than functioning as doctrinal propositions, they emerge from moments of intense

mystical experience, where ordinary language proves insufficient. Consequently, they employ paradox, metaphor, and symbolic inversion as modes of expression.

From a strictly Wittgensteinian perspective, such utterances might initially appear as nonsensical, insofar as they do not conform to the logical structure of meaningful propositions. However, this interpretation risks overlooking their performative and expressive dimensions. As studies on mystical language indicate, paradoxical and apophatic expressions are not mere failures of language, but structured attempts to articulate what exceeds direct representation (Lima, 2024). In this sense, shathahāt do not simply violate the limits of language; rather, they operate precisely at those limits, transforming them into a site of meaning production.

This paper addresses the gap between Wittgensteinian accounts of ineffability and the linguistic practices of Sufi mysticism by proposing a comparative analysis of saying, showing, and expression. It argues that shathahāt should not be understood as irrational or meaningless utterances, but as a distinctive mode of language that articulates what cannot be fully captured by propositional discourse. In doing so, the paper challenges the rigid dichotomy between saying and showing by introducing a third possibility: expression that neither fully says nor merely shows, but symbolically mediates meaning.

The central aim of this study, therefore, is to reinterpret the concept of the “unsayable” by bringing Wittgenstein’s philosophy into dialogue with Sufi shathahāt. While Wittgenstein draws a boundary that limits what can be said, Sufi discourse demonstrates how language can be extended—through paradox, analogy, and symbolism—to engage with what lies at that boundary. The paper contends that the ineffable is not entirely outside language, but exists at its limit, where meaning can be expressed without being exhausted.

By advancing this argument, the study contributes to ongoing discussions in philosophy of language and philosophy of religion, offering a cross-cultural perspective on the relationship between language, meaning, and transcendence. More importantly, it suggests that the limits of language are not merely restrictive, but productive—opening a space in which language transforms itself in order to approach what cannot be fully said.

The paper argues that Sufi shathahāt do not eliminate the limits of language identified by Ludwig Wittgenstein, but transform them into a productive space where meaning is expressed without being fully captured. This study employs a comparative philosophical method, focusing on conceptual analysis and textual interpretation. It examines Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing alongside Sufi shathahāt as a form of mystical language, in order to develop a theoretical account of expressibility.

Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein

The distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown constitutes one of the most influential and controversial aspects of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein develops a rigorous account of language grounded in what is commonly known as the picture theory of meaning. According to this view, meaningful propositions are those

that can represent possible states of affairs in the world. Language functions by “picturing” reality, establishing a structural correspondence between propositions and facts (Hong & Donghui, 2007).

Within this framework, the distinction between saying (*sagen*) and showing (*zeigen*) emerges as a fundamental limit condition of language. What can be said are propositions that meaningfully describe facts; they are logically structured and capable of truth or falsity. In contrast, what can only be shown cannot be articulated through propositional language, yet is nevertheless manifested in the very structure and use of language itself. Logical form, for instance, cannot be stated as a proposition without falling into circularity; instead, it is shown in the way language operates. The distinction between *sagen* (saying) and *zeigen* (showing) asserts that propositions depict facts, whereas logical form can only be shown. Attempting to state logical form through propositional language results in circularity; thus, logical structure manifests itself in the operations of language itself (Wittgenstein, 1922).

This distinction is not merely technical but carries significant philosophical implications. It establishes a boundary beyond which language ceases to function in its descriptive capacity. Matters such as ethics, aesthetics, and the meaning of life fall outside the domain of what can be said. They do not correspond to states of affairs in the world and therefore cannot be meaningfully represented through propositions. However, Wittgenstein does not dismiss these domains as irrelevant. On the contrary, he suggests that they are of the highest importance, precisely because they lie at the limit of language.

The notion of the ineffable arises from this boundary. The ineffable, in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, refers to that which cannot be expressed in language but is nevertheless meaningful. It includes the mystical, which Wittgenstein describes not as something that can be put into words, but as something that makes itself manifest. In this sense, the mystical is not an object of knowledge but a condition of experience. It is encountered not through description but through a form of showing that escapes propositional articulation (Lima, 2024).

Importantly, Wittgenstein’s account does not imply a simple dichotomy between meaningful and meaningless language. Rather, it introduces a more nuanced distinction between different modes of meaning. Propositional language captures factual meaning, while the ineffable pertains to a dimension of meaning that cannot be reduced to factual representation. This has led some interpreters to argue that the *Tractatus* ultimately performs a kind of self-undermining gesture: it attempts to say what can only be shown, thereby revealing the limits of its own method (Knepper, 2009).

This tension is most clearly expressed in Wittgenstein’s concluding remarks, where he suggests that his own propositions are to be understood as “ladders” to be thrown away after one has climbed them. The text thus acknowledges that its attempt to delineate the limits of language inevitably transgresses those limits. In doing so, it does not eliminate the ineffable but instead points toward it indirectly.

The distinction between saying and showing, therefore, should not be understood as a rigid separation between two entirely disconnected domains. The boundary between the sayable and the unsayable does not mark two rigidly separated

ontological realms. Rather, it constitutes two dynamic relational modes within a single linguistic experience: representation (saying) and participation (showing) (Matta, 2026). Those boundaries are formed and manifested from within (through internal relations in the use of propositions), rather than being determined by a static metaphysical truth or something lying beyond the reach of language (Sætre, 2017). In other words, an understanding of how language functions can only be gained from within the language itself (Dehnel, 2013).

In recent interpretations, scholars have suggested that Wittgenstein's later philosophy, while moving away from the strict formalism of the *Tractatus*, retains an interest in the ways language functions within forms of life. Wittgenstein himself rejected the reduction of language solely to logical-descriptive propositions (Donatelli, 2024). This shift allows for a broader understanding of meaning that includes non-propositional forms of expression. Although the early Wittgenstein draws a sharp line between saying and showing, the persistence of the ineffable within language itself raises the question of whether this boundary is as fixed as it initially appears.

This question becomes particularly relevant when considering linguistic practices that deliberately operate at the limits of expression. If the ineffable can only be shown, how should we interpret forms of language that seem to “speak” it—albeit in paradoxical or symbolic ways? The following section addresses this question by turning to the Sufi phenomenon of shathahāt, where language appears to stretch beyond its ordinary function in order to articulate experiences that resist direct representation.

Sufi Shathahāt as Linguistic Phenomenon

Within the Sufi tradition, the phenomenon of shathahāt (ecstatic or paradoxical utterances) represents a distinctive mode of religious language that operates at the limits of expression. The term shathahāt generally refers to spontaneous, often controversial statements articulated by mystics in moments of intense spiritual experience. These utterances are not intended as doctrinal formulations, but rather as expressions emerging from states of ecstasy (*wajd*) or annihilation of the self (*fanā'*), in which ordinary distinctions between subject and object, or human and divine, are radically transformed. Those utterances, which may appear chaotic to some, actually adhere to the internal logic of mysticism to demonstrate closeness to the Divine (Kazemi et al., 2024).

From a linguistic perspective, shathahāt challenge conventional assumptions about meaning, reference, and coherence. Unlike propositional discourse, which aims to describe states of affairs in a logically structured manner, shathahāt frequently take forms that appear paradoxical, metaphorical, or even contradictory. Yet, within the Sufi framework, these features are not regarded as defects of language, but as necessary strategies for articulating experiences that exceed the limits of conceptual thought (Ernst, 2011).

Classic examples of shathahāt can be found in figures such as Al-Hallaj and Bayazid Bastami. Al-Hallaj's famous utterance “*Ana al-Haqq*” (“I am the Truth”) has often been interpreted as a theological claim, and consequently as a form of heresy.

However, within the context of Sufi experience, the statement is better understood as an expression of the dissolution of the individual ego in the presence of the divine. It does not assert an identity between a human individual and God in a literal sense, but conveys a state in which the self is no longer experienced as separate. Similarly, Bayazid Bastami's ecstatic declarations, such as "Glory be to me!" (*subhānī*), employ language in ways that subvert ordinary theological and linguistic expectations.

These utterances exhibit three key characteristics that define shathahāt as a linguistic phenomenon: paradox, symbolism, and ecstatic expression. First, paradox plays a central role in destabilizing conventional meaning. Statements such as "I am the Truth" appear logically contradictory within standard theological discourse, yet they function to point beyond binary distinctions. Paradox, in this sense, is not merely a rhetorical device, but a structural feature of language when it encounters experiences that resist clear conceptualization.

Second, symbolism enables shathahāt to convey meanings that cannot be directly stated. Symbolic language operates by evocation rather than description, allowing multiple layers of meaning to coexist. In Sufi discourse, symbols often draw from familiar religious vocabulary but reconfigure it in ways that reflect transformed states of consciousness. This symbolic dimension aligns with broader theories of religious language, which emphasize the capacity of metaphor and analogy to mediate between finite language and transcendent reality (Lima, 2024).

Third, shathahāt are inseparable from the ecstatic conditions in which they arise. Unlike philosophical propositions, which are formulated through deliberate reflection, these utterances emerge spontaneously in moments of heightened affective and spiritual intensity. Their meaning, therefore, cannot be fully understood apart from the experiential context that generates them. This performative dimension further complicates attempts to evaluate shathahāt according to conventional standards of truth and falsity.

Taken together, these characteristics suggest that shathahāt should be approached not as failed propositions, but as a distinct mode of linguistic expression. They do not aim to represent reality in the manner of descriptive language; rather, they seek to evoke and communicate an encounter with what exceeds representation. In this respect, shathahāt occupy a liminal space within language, where meaning is neither fully articulated nor entirely absent. The paradoxical and symbolic character of this ecstatic utterance does not function descriptively, but rather as a performative instrument for communicating a mystical encounter that transcends verbal representation. (Ernst, 2011).

This understanding opens a productive point of comparison with Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing. While Wittgenstein maintains that the mystical can only be shown, shathahāt appear to "speak" it—albeit in forms that disrupt ordinary linguistic expectations. The question that follows is whether these utterances constitute a violation of linguistic limits, or whether they reveal an alternative way in which language can operate at its boundary. The next section explores this tension through a direct comparative analysis.

Comparative Analysis: Violation or Transformation?

The juxtaposition of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and the Sufi phenomenon of shathahāt raises a central question: do such utterances violate the limits of language, or do they transform them? At first glance, the two appear to stand in tension. Wittgenstein's early framework, as articulated in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, establishes a clear boundary between what can be meaningfully said and what lies beyond propositional articulation. In contrast, Sufi shathahāt seem to transgress this boundary by attempting to speak precisely that which is deemed unsayable.

From a strictly Wittgensteinian perspective, the answer appears straightforward. Statements such as those attributed to Al-Hallaj or Bayazid Bastami would not qualify as meaningful propositions, since they do not correspond to states of affairs in the world and cannot be evaluated in terms of truth or falsity. As such, they risk being categorized as nonsensical within the logical structure of the *Tractatus*. Indeed, Wittgenstein himself warns against attempts to articulate what can only be shown, suggesting that such efforts lead to philosophical confusion rather than clarity (Hong & Donghui, 2007).

However, this initial assessment proves insufficient when the functional and contextual dimensions of shathahāt are taken into account. These utterances are not intended as descriptive propositions, nor do they aim to convey factual information. Instead, they operate within a different register of language—one that prioritizes evocation, transformation, and experiential resonance over representation. To evaluate shathahāt solely according to the criteria of propositional meaning is therefore to misrecognize their linguistic function.

This shift in perspective invites a reconsideration of Wittgenstein's notion of the limits of language. While the *Tractatus* draws a boundary around what can be said, it does not deny the existence or significance of what lies beyond that boundary. On the contrary, Wittgenstein explicitly acknowledges that the most important aspects of human experience—ethics, aesthetics, and the mystical—belong to this domain of the unsayable. The question, then, is not whether these domains can be expressed in propositional language, but whether alternative modes of expression might render them linguistically accessible in a different sense.

It is precisely at this point that shathahāt become philosophically significant. Rather than violating the limits of language, they can be understood as operating at those limits, exploiting the flexibility of language to gesture toward meanings that cannot be fully captured. Paradox, for instance, allows language to destabilize fixed meanings and open a space for new forms of understanding. Symbolism enables the coexistence of multiple layers of meaning without reducing them to a single propositional content. Ecstatic expression situates language within a performative context, where meaning emerges through experience rather than representation.

In this sense, shathahāt do not contradict Wittgenstein's insight into the limits of language; they radicalize it. If the ineffable can only be shown, then shathahāt may be seen as attempts to "show through saying"—that is, to use language in such a way that its expressive function exceeds its descriptive capacity. This does not eliminate

the distinction between saying and showing, but complicates it by demonstrating that the boundary between the two is more porous than it appears.

Furthermore, the apparent nonsensicality of shathahāt may itself be a productive feature rather than a defect. As some interpretations of Wittgenstein suggest, nonsensical propositions in the *Tractatus* are not simply meaningless; they serve a clarificatory function by revealing the limits of language (Knepper, 2009). In a similar manner, the paradoxical structure of shathahāt exposes the inadequacy of ordinary language when confronted with transcendent experience. Their “failure” to conform to logical norms thus becomes a way of indicating the presence of a different order of meaning.

The comparison, therefore, leads to a reframing of the initial question. Shathahāt are not best understood as violations of linguistic limits, nor as straightforward instances of nonsensical language. Rather, they constitute a distinct mode of expression that emerges precisely at the boundary identified by Wittgenstein. They demonstrate that the limits of language are not merely restrictive, but generative—enabling forms of expression that would not be possible within the confines of purely propositional discourse.

This insight has broader implications for the philosophy of language. It suggests that the dichotomy between meaningful and meaningless language, or between saying and showing, may need to be reconsidered in light of linguistic practices that do not fit neatly into either category. Shathahāt reveal a third possibility: language that neither fully says nor merely shows, but operates in a liminal space where meaning is evoked, performed.

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In this way, the encounter between Wittgenstein and Sufi mysticism does not result in a simple opposition, but in a productive tension. Wittgenstein provides the conceptual framework for understanding the limits of language, while shathahāt offer concrete examples of how those limits can be engaged and transformed. The result is not a rejection of linguistic boundaries, but a deeper appreciation of their role in shaping the possibilities of expression.

Toward a Theory of Expressibility: Expressible but Not Exhaustible

The comparative analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Sufi shathahāt invites a reconsideration of a central assumption in the *Filsafat Bahasa*: that the limits of language define the limits of expression. While Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing establishes a boundary beyond which propositional language cannot meaningfully operate, contemporary discussions of ineffability suggest that this boundary does not necessarily entail the impossibility of expression, but rather indicates a transformation in how meaning is articulated (Gäb, 2020).

Recent work in philosophy of religion has further emphasized that ineffability is not simply the absence of linguistic expression, but a structural feature of certain forms of experience—particularly mystical or religious experience—which resist full conceptualization (Gäb, 2024). This opens the possibility that what is traditionally labeled “unsayable” may still be accessible through non-propositional or indirect modes of language.

Building on this insight, the present study proposes the concept of expressibility without exhaustibility. The central claim is that meanings considered ineffable are not entirely beyond language; rather, they are expressible in ways that do not fully

capture or exhaust their content. This formulation preserves Wittgenstein's insight into the limits of propositional language while rejecting the stronger conclusion that such limits imply absolute inexpressibility.

This distinction can be clarified by differentiating between two senses of linguistic adequacy. In the first sense, language is adequate when it successfully represents determinate states of affairs. In the second sense, however, language is adequate when it evokes or discloses a field of meaning that exceeds propositional structure. As recent Wittgensteinian approaches to religious language suggest, meaning is often embedded in practices, forms of life, and interpretive contexts rather than reducible to factual description (Baiașu, 2018).

Within this framework, meaning is not a fixed entity contained within language, but something that unfolds through use and interpretation. Open access studies on religious language emphasize that linguistic expressions may not have determinate propositional content independent of interpretive context, yet still function meaningfully within specific forms of life (Brandhorst, 2025). This suggests that meaning can persist even when it cannot be fully specified or stabilized.

The concept of expressibility without exhaustibility builds on this idea by emphasizing that language functions not merely as a representational system, but as a medium of ongoing disclosure. Each expression reveals aspects of meaning while leaving others unarticulated. This dynamic is particularly evident in mystical discourse, where ineffability has long been understood as a defining feature of the relation between language and transcendence (Piilola, 2023).

Sufi shathahāt exemplify this mode of expression. Their paradoxical and symbolic structures resist closure, preventing meaning from being reduced to a single propositional content. As discussed earlier, utterances such as those attributed to Al-Hallaj cannot be fully captured by doctrinal or logical analysis, yet they remain meaningful within their experiential and interpretive contexts. Their significance lies not in propositional clarity, but in their capacity to generate layered and ongoing meaning.

From this perspective, the distinction between saying and showing can be reinterpreted as a spectrum of expressibility rather than a rigid dichotomy. At one end lies propositional language, characterized by determinacy and truth-conditions; at the other lies symbolic and paradoxical language, characterized by openness and interpretive plurality. The ineffable occupies the limit of this spectrum—not as something outside language, but as that which continually exceeds any particular linguistic articulation.

This reinterpretation also sheds light on the productive role of paradox. Rather than signaling a breakdown of meaning, paradox can function as a mode of intensification, exposing the limits of conceptual language while sustaining the presence of meaning. As studies on Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion indicate, religious and mystical expressions often operate not by describing facts, but by reshaping the way language is used and experienced (Wawrzyniak, 2021).

The implications of this framework extend beyond the specific case of Sufi shathahāt. It suggests a broader model of language in which meaning is inherently inexhaustible. Language does not merely transmit meaning; it participates in its

unfolding. The limits of language, therefore, are not simply constraints, but conditions for the emergence of richer forms of expression.

In this sense, the ineffable can be redefined not as that which lies beyond language altogether, but as that which continually exceeds its linguistic articulation. This allows us to reconcile Wittgenstein's insight into the limits of language with the evident capacity of human linguistic practices—particularly in mystical traditions—to engage meaningfully with what cannot be fully said.

Implications for Philosophy of Language and Religion

The theoretical framework developed in this study—namely, the concept of expressibility without exhaustibility—carries significant implications for both Filsafat Bahasa and Filsafat Agama. By reinterpreting the limits of language not as absolute boundaries but as sites of transformation, this study challenges dominant assumptions about the relationship between meaning and linguistic form.

In philosophy of language, the analysis contributes to ongoing debates concerning the nature of meaning, particularly in relation to non-propositional forms of expression. The Wittgensteinian distinction between saying and showing has often been interpreted as establishing a strict limit to meaningful discourse. However, the examination of Sufi shathahāt suggests that language can operate meaningfully even when it departs from propositional clarity. This indicates the need for a broader conception of language—one that includes symbolic, paradoxical, and performative dimensions as legitimate modes of meaning.

Such a reconceptualization aligns with contemporary efforts to move beyond narrowly representational theories of language. Rather than viewing language solely as a system for describing facts, this study supports an understanding of language as a dynamic medium that participates in the unfolding of meaning. In this context, the limits of language do not signify the cessation of meaning, but its transformation into forms that resist closure and invite interpretation.

In the domain of philosophy of religion, the implications are equally significant. Religious language has long been criticized for its apparent lack of empirical verifiability or logical precision. From a strictly propositional standpoint, many religious statements may appear ambiguous or even nonsensical. However, the framework proposed in this paper suggests that such evaluations may be based on an overly restrictive model of meaning.

By situating religious language within the spectrum of expressibility, this study demonstrates that its function is not primarily to describe empirical reality, but to articulate experiences of transcendence that exceed ordinary conceptual frameworks. In this sense, the symbolic and paradoxical features of religious discourse are not deficiencies, but essential characteristics that enable it to engage with the ineffable.

Moreover, the comparative approach adopted in this study highlights the importance of cross-cultural dialogue in philosophical inquiry. By bringing Ludwig Wittgenstein into conversation with Sufi traditions, the paper challenges the implicit Eurocentrism of much contemporary philosophy of language. It shows that non-Western traditions offer not merely illustrative examples, but substantive contributions to core philosophical problems.

Finally, the concept of expressibility without exhaustibility opens new avenues for future research. It invites further exploration into other forms of linguistic practice—poetic, liturgical, or artistic—that operate at the limits of language. It also raises broader questions about the nature of understanding, suggesting that meaning may not always be something to be fully grasped, but something to be continually engaged.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that while Wittgenstein identifies a boundary beyond which propositional language cannot meaningfully operate, Sufi shathahāt demonstrate that this boundary does not mark the end of expression, but rather its transformation. By analyzing the paradoxical, symbolic, and ecstatic dimensions of shathahāt, the study has shown that such utterances do not violate the limits of language, but instead operate within them in a distinct mode. They exemplify a form of expression that does not aim at propositional clarity, but at evoking and sustaining meaning in ways that exceed conceptual determination.

On this basis, the paper has proposed the concept of expressibility without exhaustibility as a means of rethinking the nature of the ineffable. Rather than treating the ineffable as that which lies entirely beyond language, it has been redefined as that which can be expressed without being fully captured. This formulation preserves the insight that language has limits, while also affirming its capacity to operate creatively at those limits.

The implications of this argument extend beyond the specific comparison undertaken in this study. They suggest that the relationship between language and meaning is more dynamic and complex than is often assumed. Language does not merely represent reality; it also participates in the ongoing disclosure of meaning, particularly in contexts where experience exceeds conceptual articulation.

In conclusion, the ineffable is not located outside language, but at its edge—where language, stretched to its limits, continues to express what it cannot fully contain. It is in this space of tension, rather than in silence alone, that some of the most significant dimensions of human experience find their expression.

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